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Response by Professors McDougal* and Reisman t
We had not thought it necessary in a journal for international
lawyers to spell out in detail the content of the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention or to multiply references to establish its long
and continuing authority. A venerable institution of customary
international law, reconfirmed at the inception of the modern period
by both Grotius and Vattel, humanitarian intervention has been
regarded as accepted law by most contemporary international lawyers.
The foundation of the doctrine has been the shared concern of the
peoples of the world for the minimum conditions of the survival of
humanity. The historic content of the doctrine is clearly stated by
Professor Borchard in his classic book on The Diplomatic Protection of
Citizens Abroad 14 (1922):
...(W)here a state under exceptional circumstances disregards certain
rights of its own citizens over whom presumably it has absolute
sovereignty, the other states of the family of nations are authorized by
international law to intervene on grounds of humanity. When these
"human" rights are habitually violated, one or more states may
intervene in the name of the society of nations and may take such
measures as to substitute at least temporarily, if not permanently, its
own sovereignty for that of the state thus controlled. Whatever the
origin, therefore, of the rights of the individual, it seems assured that
these essential rights rest upon the ultimate sanction of international
law, and will be protected, in the last resort, by the most appropriate
organ of the international community.
That this doctrine has been, and remains the authoritative expectation
of the peoples of the world is documented by a host of sources.
It is curious that one so concerned for rigor in scholarship as
Professor Marshall does not even quote the whole of the footnote he
attacks. The portion he omits reads:
"The International Law of the Future," 399 International Conciliation
268; 38 A.J.I.L. Supp. 55 (1944) provides: "Each state has a legal duty
to see that conditions prevailing within its territory do not menace
international peace and order, and to this end it must treat its own
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population in a way which will not violate the dictates of humanity and
justice or shock the conscience of mankind.
It may be added that this formulation represented a "community of
views" of a large number of this country's most distinguished
international lawyers, achieved after extended discussions under the
auspices of the American Bar Association and with leadership from the
late Judge Manley 0. Hudson.
If Professor Marshall neglected to read a moiety of our footnote,
he has rather carelessly misconstrued the half which did catch his eye.
The Moore survey does indeed indicate the reluctance on the part of
our government to become embroiled in humanitarian interventions.
Reluctance is not equivalent to rejection. One hardly needs to note that
such an operation is politically volatile and is undertaken only in the
most exigent of circumstances. But Judge Moore's documentary
collection abundantly demonstrates that our country has in fact
intervened for purposes of humanitarian consideration and explains
why. This trend of practice culminated in the U.S. intervention in
Cuba, before which President McKinley said that
If it shall hereafter appear to be a duty imposed by our obligations to
intervene with force, it shall be without fault on our part and only
because the necessity for such action will be so clear as to command the
support and approval of the civilized world. (6 Moore, Digest 222)
President Buchanan's message in 1859, the single document from
Moore which Professor Marshall does choose to cite, was delivered in
regard to the Mortara case, an extremely complicated affair, many of
the key facts of which were in doubt. Professor Marshall neglects to cite
five instances of positive humanitarian intervention by the diplomatic
instrument recounted on the preceding two pages of Volume Six of
Moore's Digest, one of which was during the incumbency of President
Buchanan!
We can only record perplexity about Professor Marshall's comment on Sir Hersh Lauterpacht's leading work on International Law
and Human Rights. Marshall cites the following statement by Judge
Lauterpacht to which, among others, we had adverted: "The law of
nations, and, we say, the law of nature, by denying, as they needs must
do, the absolute sovereignty of States, give their imprimatur to the
indestructible sovereignty of man." Marshall describes this, for reasons
unknown to us, as one of "several philosophic expressions of the
author's aspiring outlook." However eloquent, this statement is,
nonetheless, accurately descriptive both of international law and of
most versions of natural law and, indeed, one hardly unique to Judge
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Lauterpacht. Grotius,1 Vattel/ Oppenheim, 3 Borchard, 4 and Guggenheim,' to name only some of the more prominent, have made
comparable statements. The statement in Judge Lauterpacht's book to
which our footnote made direct reference reads:
International law has contributed in a more direct way to the
maintenance of the rights of man and the protection of his welfare by
the significant, though hesitating and infrequent, practice of humanitarian intervention such as that on behalf of the Greek people in 1827
and, subsequently, of the oppressed Armenians-and Christians generally-in Turkey; by the practice, which began in the middle of the
seventeenth century, of safeguarding through treaties the right of
religious freedom; by the long series of treaties of a humanitarian
character ranging from slavery conventions to the imposing structure of
conventions concluded under the aegis of the International Labour
Organization; by the Minorities Treaties entered into after the First
World War; and by the systems of mandates and trusteeship set up,
respectively, after the two World Wars. (Id. at 120-121)
We regarded this as a statement of law, in the sense of a description of
existing community expectation, and not as a mere philosophic
expression of aspiring outlook. Similarly, Judge Lauterpacht's statement at page 186 of his book, corroborating the continuing internationality of human rights and the denial of the exclusivity of domestic
jurisdiction if "such rights and freedoms were grievously outraged so as
to create conditions which threaten peace... ,,6 can scarcely be
questioned. If it is possible for a careful reader to retain doubts as to
Judge Lauterpacht's position on humanitarian intervention in the light
of the above citations, he may consult a recent edition of Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, that vademecum of practicing lawyers, for an
unequivocal reiteration of the above views:
There is general agreement that, by virtue of its personal and territorial
supremacy, a State can treat its own nationals according to discretion.
But there is a substantial body of opinion and of practice in support of
the view that there are limits to that discretion and that when a State
renders itself guilty of cruelties against and persecution of its nationals
in such a way as to deny their fundamental human rights and to shock
the conscience of mankind, intervention in the interest of humanity is
legally permissible. 7
GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, Chapter XXV, pp. 285-289
(Universal Classics Library ed. 1901).
2
2 VATTEL, DROIT DE GENS 56.
3 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 347 (1905).
4 BORCHARD, op. cit. at 14.
s 1 GUGGENHEIM, TRAITE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 289 (195 3).
6
UNCIO Doc. 723, 1/t A/19 at p. 10, cited in Lauterpacht, ibid.
7 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 279 (7th ed. H. Lauterpacht, editor (1948).
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There can, in short, be no question of Sir Hersh Lauterpacht's position
on humanitarian intervention.
Professor Marshall's comment on Dean Murty's work is equally
perplexing. As all students of international law know, one of the great
controversies of the past two decades has been about the extent to
which the inherited institutions of customary international law apply to
the new nations. A number of scholars in the developing nations have
taken the radical position that inherited customary law binds the new
states only insofar as they explicitly accept it. While this is a doctrine
which is dubious in terms of practice and theory, it has found some
adherents. Hence the fact that Dean Murty, a leading Asian scholar, has
associated himself with the customary doctrine of humanitarian
intervention is an important datum confirming the continuing validity
of the institution. 7 a The method by which Dean Murty reaches his
conclusion is of only passing interest, yet the references he cites amply
support his careful text. The reference to Hall' was undoubtedly
intended to be to pp. 342-345, which offer a full discussion of
humanitarian intervention with a reluctant recognition of its lawfulness
under appropriate circumstances.
In our contemporary strife-torn world, with Biafra following
quickly upon the continuing tragedy of Rhodesia and with perhaps
even greater tragedies to come, Professor Marshall's bland demurrer to
the entire institution of humanitarian intervention can only merit
prompt consignment to complete oblivion. If a comprehensive survey
of the more important past instances of humanitarian intervention,
reflecting community expectations about the lawfulness of such
measures is required to effect such consignment, the raw materials for
such survey are readily accessible in many sources. We may cite as the
more dramatic examples the Greek intervention of 1830, the Syrian
intervention of 1860, the Cretan intervention of 1866, the Bosnian,
Herzegovinan and Bulgarian intervention, the Cuban intervention of
1898-99, the Macedonian intervention of 1903 and the institutional
practices of the League of Nations, the International Labor Organization and the United Nations. The numerous interventions by the United
States from the Barbary intervention of 1858 through to the Cuban
intervention and the many protestations on behalf of the Jews of
Russia and Rumania are documented in detail in the sixth volume of
7a Significantly, a Nepalese scholar has taken an even stronger position on humanitarian

intervention: Shruba Bar Singh Thapa, HumanitarianIntervention (unpublished dissertation,
McGill University, 1968).
8 HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (8th ed. Higgins, editor, 1924).
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Moore's Digest. The humanitarian interventions in the Congo and in the
Dominican Republic (the latter criticized on many grounds but not
with respect to the validity of a humanitarian intervention in
appropriate circumstances) 9 are matters of recent record.
Doctrinal examinations and confirmations, in addition to the
many we have cited above, are found in 1 Guggenheim, Traite de Droit
International Public 289 (1953), Rougier, La Theorie de l'Intervention
d'Humanite, 1910 Revue Generale de Droit International Public 516,
Stowell, Intervention in International Law 145 (1921), Oppenheim,
International Law 145 (1905), Ganji, International Protection of
Human Rights (1962). Recent American discussions are found in
Lillich, Forcible Self-Help by States to ProtectHuman Rights, 53 Iowa
L. R. 325 (1967), Nanda, The United States Action in the Dominican
Crisis: Impact on World Order 43 Denver Law Journal 439 (1966) and
Thomas & Thomas, The Dominican Republic Crisis 1965 (1967).
The continuing authority of community expectations about the
lawfulness of humanitarian intervention is greatly confirmed by all the
contemporary developments associated with the United Nations. The
repeated, insistent emphasis upon its underlying policies can only be
regarded as strengthening, not weakening, the historic remedy. Article
1, paragraph 2 of the United Nations Charter affirms the right of
self-determination of peoples and paragraph 3 commits the UN
To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems
of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and in
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion...
The Charter's conception of human rights was articulated in detail in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights '0 (Resolution 217 A (111)
of 1948). The Preamble to this Declaration, a luminously moving
expression of human dignity, emphasized the Charter's conception of
the inseparability of human rights and international peace. The first
paragraph stated that
... (T)he inherent dignity and ... equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and
peace in the world.
The second paragraph record that
.. . (D)isregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in
barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind ...
9 See, for example, the remarks, in this regard, of Senators Morse, Fulbright and
Clark in 111 CongressionalRecord 23369, 23001, 26183.
10 Resolution 217 A (1l1) General Assembly, December 10, 1948.
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The third preambular paragraph stated that
(I)t is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a
last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human
rights should be protected by the rule of law...
Of the 29 articles of the Declaration, the most exigent in regard to
humanitarian intervention are Articles 3 and 5. Article 3 provides that
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person.
Article 5 provides that
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.
A day before the General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, it adopted the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. ' This convention, a reexpression in explicit treaty form of fundamental policies long sought in
It is
customary international law"2 has been in force since 195 1.'
intervention
of
humanitarian
institution
contemporary
the
to
relevant
in that it explicitly characterizes actions which, under historic
international law, would have justified third party intervention for
humanitarian purposes. Article 1 of the Convention states that
..(G)enocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time 'f war,
is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and
to punish.
Genocide is defined as
... (A)ny of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such.
The first three subsections of Article II offer itemization:
a)
b)
group;
c)
lated to

Killing members of the group;
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calcubring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.

The continuing validity of the basic policies underlying humanitarian intervention are, thus, reiterated in the operational Articles of
11 78 United Nations Treaty Series 277, Registration No. 1021.
12 The explicit language of Article I of the Genocide Convention is "The parties confirm
that genocide ... is a crime under international law... "
For the historic policies underlying humanitarian intervention and now sought in the
Genocide Convention, see the many references set out in our text above. See also McDougal
and Arens, The Genocide Convention and the Constitution, 3 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 683 (1950).
13 In accordance with Article XIII: ST/Leg/3, Rev. 1.
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the Charter and the Genocide Convention. Insofar as human rights
deprivations giving cause for humanitarian intervention constitute a
"threat to the peace" or "breach of the peace" or "act of aggression,"
the Security Council, under Chapter VII of the Charter, is seized with a
mandatory jurisdiction. 1 4 Should the Council be unable to function,
the secondary competence of the General Assembly, under the Uniting
for Peace Resolution,' s becomes operative and the Assembly may
execute duties and arrogate powers comparable to those of the Council
insofar as its action is consistent with the major purposes and principles
of the Organization.' 6 But the Charter also creates a separate form of
action for human rights deprivations. Article 55 of the Charter
reaffirms that the United Nations shall promote
(U)niversal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all...
Article 56 transforms that commitment into an active obligation for
joint and separate action in defense of human rights.
All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in
cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes
set forth in Article 55.
Hence, the cumulative effect of the Charter in regard to the basic
policies of the customary institution of humanitarian intervention is to
create a coordinate responsibility for the active protection of human
rights: members may act jointly with the Organization in what might be
termed a new organized, explicitly conventional, humanitarian intervention or singly or collectively in the customary or international common
law humanitarian intervention. Any other interpretation would be
suicidally destructive of the explicit major purposes for which the
United Nations was established.
The novel coordinate character of the humanitarian intervention
now authorized is paralleled and illustrated in the Genocide Convention. Article VIII provides that
Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the
United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United
Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression
of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III.1'7
14 Charter Articles 24 and 39.
is Resolution 377A (V).
16 On possible forms of Assembly action under this authority, see infra part Ill.
17 It is important to note that the authority accorded to the United Nations is
not directed
to a specific organ, but rather to a "competent organ". Hence, the authority could become
specific either to the Security Council, the General Assembly or, for that matter, the International Court of Justice.
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Article V further enjoins parties to the Convention to effect national
legislation providing effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide
and Article VI removes the crime of genocide from the putative
immunity of the claim of "Act of State." In short, parties to the
Genocide Convention are obliged to enforce its policies separately as
well as conjointly with the United Nations.
In the perspective of historic practice and of all the many recent
United Nations measures for the promotion of human rights, measures
reflecting the deepest contemporary demands and expectations of the
peoples of the world, Professor Marshall's demurrer to the authority of
humanitarian intervention would appear about as realistic as his
characterization of Mr. Acheson's piece as "a mighty blast." It may be
recalled that Justice Goldberg offered a different characterization,
which could be of continuing relevance.

InternationalLawyer, Vol. 3 No. 2

